```
02AHQue0
     UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
1
     SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
     -----x
 2
3
     UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
 4
                V.
                                            24 Cr. 291 (LAK)
5
     MATTHEW QUEEN,
6
                                            Oral Argument
                    Defendant.
 7
     -----x
 8
                                            New York, N.Y.
9
                                            October 2, 2024
                                            2:15 p.m.
10
     Before:
11
12
                         HON. LEWIS A. KAPLAN,
13
                                            District Judge
14
                              APPEARANCES
15
     DAMIAN WILLIAMS
          United States Attorney for the
16
          Southern District of New York
     BY: JACQUELINE CHRISTINE KELLY
17
          MARY CHRISTINE SLAVIK
          Assistant United States Attorneys
18
     SAM A. SCHMIDT
19
          Attorney for Defendant
20
21
22
23
24
25
```

```
THE DEPUTY CLERK: United States against Matthew
1
 2
             Government, are you ready? Can you please put your
      Oueen.
 3
      appearance on the record.
              MS. KELLY: Yes. Good afternoon, your Honor.
 4
5
      Jacqueline Kelly and Christy Slavik, for the government.
6
               THE COURT: Thank you.
 7
               THE DEPUTY CLERK: Defendant, are you ready?
8
              MR. SCHMIDT: We are ready, your Honor. Good
      afternoon. Sam Schmidt, for Matthew Queen. Mr. Queen is
9
10
      virtually here.
11
               THE COURT: Well, he's listening on the telephone is
12
      what I understand. Is that right?
13
               THE DEPUTY CLERK: And he can see on video as well.
14
               THE COURT: Yes, he's virtually here.
15
               OK. Mr. Schmidt, your motion.
              MR. SCHMIDT: Yes. First, your Honor, I apologize
16
17
      for --
               THE COURT: The lectern, please.
18
19
              MR. SCHMIDT: Oh.
20
               THE COURT: I'll hear you better from there.
21
              MR. SCHMIDT: Your Honor, I do apologize for any
22
      confusion with the exhibits.
23
               THE COURT: OK. No worries.
24
              MR. SCHMIDT: Your Honor, this is actually a fairly
25
      brief motion, and it's an unusual one, I acknowledge that. But
```

```
in this case, the government has set forth what the crime was.

And in the present information, the crime is the false

documents given to the government with the intent to obstruct,

impede, influence on the investigation.
```

Now, in this case the physical documents that we're talking about are the notes that Mr. Queen wrote at a time in May and not at the time when he first told both the government and others he wrote it.

THE COURT: And not on the date which at the top of the notes is contained  $\overline{\phantom{a}}$ 

MR. SCHMIDT: That is correct.

THE COURT: — written by him.

MR. SCHMIDT: That is correct.

THE COURT: So the date there — I know you won't like the word "false" — but it's certainly inaccurate.

MR. SCHMIDT: That is correct.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. SCHMIDT: The notes were given, with my understanding, because I do not have — unfortunately, Mr. Queen's attorney at that time is deceased, but based on the document that the government provided, which is notes by Ms. Kelly of the conversation with the attorney on —

THE COURT: And those notes are not in the information or the indictment, correct?

MR. SCHMIDT: The notes are not in the information or

the indictment, but in the — and I make the assumption that the notes prepared by Ms. Kelly accurately reflect the conversation that she had with the attorney. Government has not —  $\,$ 

THE COURT: And so, best case, even granting the assumption, it's hearsay.

MR. SCHMIDT: It is hearsay, but it's hearsay as it —
THE COURT: It's actually double hearsay, but I'm
granting you the assumption, for the sake of discussion, that
Ms. Kelly accurately recorded what this now deceased person
told her, or at least what she understood that person to have
said, offered for the truth of what that person said.

MR. SCHMIDT: Well, it's actually — whether it's offered for the proof or not is not actually relevant. It's actually offered for that it was said. The reason why I say that is that the basis of the government's charge is that the physical notes that was given to them after this conversation does not include the portion concerning what Employee-1 said, the language that is the subject to the obstruction statute, that being: "make this disappear," "we never had this meeting," and "this is the only copy that they have." The reason is that if you take the notes and include the statements made relating to that conversation, that January 20 — I don't remember the exact date — conversation when my client was present, right, you have a document that is not false for the purpose of

obstructing --

THE COURT: No, you have a document that is false, which is supposedly contradicted by another document that doesn't even contain an account of the relevant facts.

MR. SCHMIDT: It does contain the relevant facts.

THE COURT: To wit?

MR. SCHMIDT: The document that you're talking about, which is the notes by the government of the conversation, it includes the facts that the government indicates makes it false.

THE COURT: To wit, what is that fact?

MR. SCHMIDT: The facts that Employee-1 did say this needs to go away, that we didn't have this conversation, and the only copy is the one you have — and this is by Employee-2 — the only one is the one you have on my computer. Those are the statements that were not included in the notes that the government claims is false because of that.

THE COURT: OK.

MR. SCHMIDT: Now, it is, I think, clear now, under the Rules of Evidence, that a document that is not complete can be completed by oral statements.

THE COURT: If what condition is satisfied?

MR. SCHMIDT: That it's relevant.

THE COURT: If it's necessary to accomplish a particular purpose, right?

02AHQue0 1 MR. SCHMIDT: And the purpose is to fully understand. 2 THE COURT: And who decides if it's necessary fully to 3 understand the document? 4 MR. SCHMIDT: Well, the indictment. 5 THE COURT: It's a preliminary question of fact, isn't 6 it, under Rule 104? 7 MR. SCHMIDT: It would be if the information did not define what made the document false. The information defines 8 9 what makes the document false, and by defining it - but, 10 indeed, having that information prior to receiving the 11 document, it no longer is false, nor can it be material. 12 the government does leave out the requirement that the false 13 document be material. 14 THE COURT: Well, the case you cited for the 15 proposition that the Second Circuit, in contrast to other circuits, requires materiality does not remotely support that 16 17 proposition. It isn't even close. 18 MR. SCHMIDT: I respectfully disagree. 19 THE COURT: Well, you're entitled, but that's my 20 reading of it.

MR. SCHMIDT: The Second Circuit said that —

21

22

23

24

25

THE COURT: It was a case having to do with whether there was a constructive amendment of the charging instrument, and at the end of it, the Second Circuit said, in substance, "and besides, it was obviously material," which is different

from a holding that materiality is an element of the offense.

And it had to do with the issue of constructive amendment, not the sufficiency of the charging instrument.

MR. SCHMIDT: Your Honor, the Court also stated that by not requesting that the document had to be material, they waived that argument. Why would they — what would be the purpose —

THE COURT: Therefore, making whatever the Second

Circuit said on the issue of materiality dictum, unnecessary to

the result because the argument had been waived. You're

absolutely right about that.

MR. SCHMIDT: That is the only relevant decision on this section, your Honor, by the Second Circuit.

THE COURT: Yes, well,  $Marbury\ v.\ Madison$  doesn't help you any more than that.

MR. SCHMIDT: Well, it certainly seems to me it indicates that it does, and the government, in their response, did not oppose the need for materiality.

THE COURT: It's quite possible because it's a red herring in this case, on this motion. Trial's another matter. That issue was not foreclosed in the Second Circuit based on the authority you cited to me.

MR. SCHMIDT: I think it's persuasive, though.

THE COURT: Well, the question is how much?

MR. SCHMIDT: So there is no — so the issue, your

Honor, isn't whether it's a jury question. It's actually more of a legal question whether a document that is given to the government that, for argument sake, is incomplete, leaving out facts that the government believes is true, that is supplemented by the facts that the government believes is necessary prior to receiving that document means that that document is not indeed incomplete nor false. That's the undisputed facts. A jury does not need to make a determination of any of that. That is undisputed.

If your Honor finds that such a document, with the statements made by the attorney before the document was given to the government, is still — can still be false and that there's another fact-finding to be needed, then —

THE COURT: If the document was created earlier, as it obviously had to have been for it to exist in the first place, with the intent that it would impede the investigation by creating the impression that those statements had not been uttered in January, on the date the notes bear, and assuming materiality is either satisfied or not necessary, isn't that a crime?

MR. SCHMIDT: The complicated factor in this case — and, again, this may be a fact — is that, pursuant to a subpoena in 2022, the seminary was required to turn over any document that related to sexual harassment or sexual abuse. So the document itself was turned over because it was required to

be.

THE COURT: So?

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$  SCHMIDT: And not created to impact the investigation. That —

THE COURT: My hypothetical, or my question, is suppose the purpose of creating it was to impede the investigation and that the creator believed at that time and intended at that time that it would be turned over pursuant to the subpoena for the precise purpose of impeding the investigation, not knowing that maybe the lawyer would make the statement on which you rely, assuming it was made in the first place. That's a crime under 1519, isn't it?

MR. SCHMIDT: Well, it's not knowing that the lawyer would do that, and I guess then it's a factual question whether he knew it, but the note — that note themselves, I think, makes it absolutely clear that he was told by Mr. Queen that information.

THE COURT: The notes you're talking about are which notes?

MR. SCHMIDT: The government notes of the conversation.

THE COURT: Which didn't exist at the time I'm inquiring about because the conversation hadn't even taken place between the government and the lawyer.

MR. SCHMIDT: Then it's a factual issue that what —

2.2

what your Honor is saying, it's a factual issue why the notes were created themselves, and at that moment, that's a determination whether or not it's a violation of 1519; is that what your Honor is saying?

THE COURT: I'm not saying it's a factual issue. I'm asking you to assume, for the sake of discussion, that it was created for the purpose of misleading the government as to what happened in that conversation and misdated, inaccurately dated, in order to promote the ability of the document to deceive the government. The crime, in other words, was complete long before the documents were turned over, wasn't it, if it was a crime at all?

MR. SCHMIDT: The documents were actually created subsequent to the conversation that  ${\rm Mr.}$  —

THE COURT: In April, if I understand.

MR. SCHMIDT: No, no, it was in May, and it was subsequent to the conversation with the attorney.

THE COURT: Subsequent to what conversation by whom with the attorney?

MR. SCHMIDT: Mr. Queen's conversation with the attorney. It was created afterwards and given to the attorney afterwards.

THE COURT: So is it your submission that what happened is there are no documents up until the point where Queen speaks to the attorney, and after he speaks to the

```
1
      attorney, he then creates these notes; he dates them in
 2
      January, though he creates them in May; and he then gives them
      to the attorney, who then has the conversation with Ms. Kelly
 3
 4
      that you claim, and then turns over the notes? Is that your —
 5
               MR. SCHMIDT: That is correct.
6
               THE COURT: That's your theory.
 7
               MR. SCHMIDT: That is correct. It's correct because
      of the requirement that he turn over anything to do with any
8
9
      kind of sexual abuse claims, turn that over as well as other
10
      documents that were made available to the government.
11
               THE COURT: So he created a false document in order to
      further turning it over to the government?
12
13
               MR. SCHMIDT: No, he made a false document — he made
14
      a document -
15
               THE COURT: With a false date.
16
               MR. SCHMIDT: — to satisfy the need to turn over
17
      something because he was required, or believed he was required,
18
      under the subpoena.
19
               THE COURT: And because he had told several people
20
      that he had contemporaneous notes?
21
               MR. SCHMIDT: And he told several people that he did,
22
      yes.
23
               THE COURT: And that had been false, in your view?
24
               MR. SCHMIDT: I'm sorry?
25
               THE COURT: Your position is the statements he made to
```

others earlier that he had contemporaneous notes were false statements?

MR. SCHMIDT: That's correct.

THE COURT: Because there were no contemporaneous notes.

MR. SCHMIDT: That is correct. That is correct.

THE COURT: OK.

MR. SCHMIDT: The document —

THE COURT: Ultimately, your argument to the jury might be — I'm just playing lawyer for a minute — the reason the false date is on the notes, that you claim he put there after talking to the lawyer, was to somehow reconcile the newly created notes with his previous false statements to the other employees that he had contemporaneous notes, which he never had?

MR. SCHMIDT: That is correct.

THE COURT: You don't think there's an issue of fact there, maybe just a little one?

MR. SCHMIDT: Well, your Honor, there would be an issue of fact if the information did not specify the nature of the so-called false document. It's very specific, and because it's very specific and because it relates to being turned over to the government, not actually the creation of it, it talks about the crime being making it available to the government. It does not say the creation of it.

25

1 THE COURT: Anything else? 2 MR. SCHMIDT: No, that's it, your Honor. 3 THE COURT: OK. Thank you. 4 Ms. Kelly. 5 MS. KELLY: Your Honor, I plan to be very brief 6 today ---7 THE COURT: Feel free. MS. KELLY: — and rely on our submission, which I 8 9 think lays out in more detail the points I want to make today. 10 I think defense counsel's presentation today 11 underscores exactly why this motion is inappropriate. This is 12 not, while styled as a motion to dismiss, a motion to dismiss. 13 Mr. Schmidt is seeking a motion for summary judgment based on 14 facts that are far outside what is alleged in the four corners of the information in this case. That exact attempt has been 15 foreclosed by the case law in this circuit, which defense 16 17 counsel acknowledges in his motion, and I think just can't tap 18 dance around today. As is well-established and well-known to your Honor, 19 20 the only requirements in a charging instrument — an indictment 21 or, as here, an information — is that the instrument track the 22 language of the statute charged and state the approximate time 23 and place of the offense so that it contains the elements of 24 the offenses charged and it provides adequate notice to the

defendant. These requirements are set forth in the cases cited

in our opposition: Stavroulakis, Vilar, Wedd.

Second Circuit case law also says dismissal is a drastic remedy. That's the Walters case. Here, clearly, dismissal is not warranted. The information meets all of these requirements: The statutory allegations track the language of 1519, it contains all the elements of the offense, it states the approximate time and place of the offense, and it thus provides sufficient notice to the defendant of the charge against he must defend.

In his briefs, the defendant relies on cases that are not applicable. Your Honor talked about one of them already with defense counsel. He relies also on a case called Yakou. That's an out-of-circuit case from D.C. that recognized that a district court may dismiss an indictment based on a question of law where there's no timely objection made by the government. That's 420 F.3d at 247. That is, obviously, far afield from the situation here. The government has clearly made a timely objection to the facts that are asserted without support beyond the information.

And the question of dismissal is not a question of law. There are numerous factual disputes, including the ones that your Honor just went through with defense counsel, and these are inextricably intertwined with the defendant's potential culpability in this case. That quote, "inextricably intertwined with the defendant's potential culpability," that

comes from a case cited by the defendant, Aiyer, 33 F.4th at 116. Indeed, in his motion and here today, the defendant is relying on many facts that are outside the allegations in the information. Many of those are inaccurate or unsupported by admissible evidence, but those are questions for another day. Those are questions that will be presented to the jury at trial.

As the government noted in our opposition, we're not relying on any facts beyond those alleged in the information, because those are the only ones relevant to the inquiry before the Court today. And critically, the government has not and will not today make a full proffer of its evidence. Therefore, the information here is "not subject to a challenge based on the quality or quantity of evidence." That's the Alfonso case, 143 F.3d at 776.

THE COURT: What is the government's position on whether materiality is an element?

MS. KELLY: The government's position is, with respect to omissions, there is case law supporting that the omission must be material with respect to the falsity element. However, with respect to an affirmative false statement, it is not the government's position that materiality is required, and as your Honor noted, that requirement is not supported by Second Circuit case law, and the case that the defendant cites does not stand for that proposition.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

THE COURT: Is the only respect in which the government claims falsity the alleged omission, or do you rely also on the misdating or anything else? MS. KELLY: So the government alleges two things in the information: First, that the notes were purportedly contemporaneous notes, and that's in paragraph 7 of the information; and second, with respect to the omission, that the notes leave out a portion, an important portion, of the conversation that the defendant had heard. So it relies on those two allegations to support that element of the crime. THE COURT: So it's the misdating and the omission? That's correct, your Honor. MS. KELLY: OK. Anything else? THE COURT: Nothing, your Honor, unless you have MS. KELLY: further questions. THE COURT: No, I don't. Thank you. Mr. Schmidt, anything else?

MR. SCHMIDT: Briefly, your Honor.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. SCHMIDT: The only portion that supports what your Honor was discussing, the materiality, is the purported date that it was prepared as being affirmatively false. It would seem unreasonable to avoid the need for materiality where the primary basis is that the information is not complete to make it a false document. Logically, if the date was wrong but all

of the information in the document was correct, to find that that was a false document would not be reasonable or logical if the document was complete and accurate.

THE COURT: Sure, it is. It could be because the whole point is that the document would be entitled to greater credence as to what it stated substantively by virtue of the fact that it was contemporaneous, and that indeed is why, no doubt — I shouldn't say "no doubt" — but that is certainly a basis on which one could conclude that that's why they were misdated in the first place.

MR. SCHMIDT: Well, in this case, your Honor, it's if the document was complete, as indicated by the statements made by the attorney. But, say, if it was in the document itself, since that was the nature of the investigation and it was supportive of the investigation, then it would not be seeking to influence it in any way.

THE COURT: Then there would be no omission. But if it were not helpful to the investigation but, rather, exculpatory, the degree to which it was exculpatory would depend, in no small measure, on the fact that they were purportedly contemporaneous notes.

MR. SCHMIDT: I don't disagree with that.

THE COURT: OK.

THE COURT: Yes, it is, because your position is that they were complete.

MR. SCHMIDT: My position was that it was complete — THE COURT: Yes.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$  SCHMIDT: — in the manner that assisted the investigation and did not obstruct the investigation.

THE COURT: OK. I think I have your argument.

The motion is denied. It's a motion for summary judgment in sheep's clothing, to mix the metaphor. There are clearly issues of fact. I'm not entitled to resolve them now. The motion depends on material outside the four corners of the information. The rule of completeness does not help the defense here at all. The rule of completeness applies to the receipt of evidence at trial or on a motion for summary judgment, and that's not what we're dealing with. Furthermore, I accept the arguments contained in the government's memorandum, which I'm not going to bother restating in total.

Mr. Schmidt, defense counsel sometimes lose cases or arguments, not because they didn't do a good job, but because the facts or the law are against them. You and I have been doing this together on occasion for a very long time, and I have the greatest respect. I understand you work with what you've got, and that's all there is to say about it. I mean, you win some; you lose some. You suit up for them all.

Now, trial is now set for November 13 at 9:30. Is it

going to happen? Obviously, nobody's bound by an answer, but I want to have an indication.

MR. SCHMIDT: Your Honor, it requires me to raise a particular issue now. The government has informed me that they will be superseding the information with an indictment, including a 1001 charge. I have received what the government has purported to be 3500 material and *Giglio* material, some of which also includes, in my mind, *Brady* material. However, I received it for attorneys' eyes only.

At this point, not being able to discuss with my client the substance of much of the material in there, now knowing that a 1001 charge is coming, makes it impossible for me to discuss with him whether we are indeed going to be proceeding to trial on November 13. Therefore, for me to actually act as his attorney in every respect, I request that the material no longer be attorneys' eyes only. That it can be under the protective order, but that I can discuss and show my client the material that is in there so he can make a decision with all the information available on whether we're going to proceed to trial on November 13.

THE COURT: Well, I understand your point. Have you discussed this with the government yet?

MR. SCHMIDT: I raised it with them, but I haven't gotten an answer as to when I'll be able to review this with apply client because I did just find out about the 1001 charge

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

that is expected.

THE COURT: What's the schedule, Ms. Kelly, on the superseder?

MS. KELLY: Well, your Honor, the government intends to do two things in short order: We do intend to supersede to add a 1001 charge based on the defendant's false statements in his Fort Worth interview with the government in May of 2023 and in his New York interview on June 20 of 2023. We also, as previewed for defense counsel — I think it's no secret in this case that the government has made efforts to resolve the case, and we would like to make a plea offer to the defendant, and we intend to do that. We've advised defense counsel that, to the extent that there should be further discussions on that, we should do that as quickly as possible and that we intend to supersede. So I expect that both of those things, the plea offer and the superseder, will be accomplished in the next two weeks, your Honor. There's no additional discovery. Everything is contained in what we've already produced.

And with respect to the 3500, as your Honor knows, there have been issues with the protective order in this case. All of the witnesses, or the vast majority of the witnesses in this case, are people well known to the defendant, and the government has concerns about, even under the protective order, how the material will be treated. We don't object, obviously,

to the defendant having ample time to consult with his attorney

about the 3500 material, but without knowing what the trial date in the case is going to be, it's difficult to agree to it being turned over. We turned it over to the defense early without a schedule set by the Court, both so that would facilitate these discussions about a resolution and also so that there is ample time to consider that information.

MR. SCHMIDT: If I may, your Honor?

THE COURT: Just a minute.

When do you intend to file and unseal any superseding indictment? Because you know the speedy trial clock prevents you from going to trial on November 13 if you don't supersede till 29 days before the trial date.

MS. KELLY: Yes, your Honor. So we have scheduled grand jury time for the week of the 14th. The 14th is a court holiday, and this grand jury sits on days that implicate that. But we expect to go to grand jury that week.

THE COURT: Well, is that going to be in time?

MS. KELLY: It's butting up to the date, your Honor, but it is that same week.

THE COURT: Yes, I understand, but is it butting up to it from the too late side or from the too early side?

MR. SCHMIDT: November has 30 days.

MS. KELLY: I think we can make it work, your Honor. It will be within the 30 days.

THE COURT: OK.

```
1
               MR. SCHMIDT: If I may, your Honor?
 2
               THE COURT: Yes, please.
 3
               MR. SCHMIDT: Mr. Queen, or his wife or anyone else
 4
      he's in contact with, has not had a single conversation,
 5
      attempt to have a single conversation with any of the
6
      witnesses.
 7
               THE COURT: Yes, but let me interrupt. The first
      thing that needs to happen is you and the government need to
8
9
      have a serious conversation about this and see whether you
10
      can't resolve it on your own. I'm not as well situated as
11
      either of you to decide what you should be able to do and what
12
      you shouldn't. At least get to the point where you've either
13
      resolved it or have some finite issue for me to deal with.
14
               MR. SCHMIDT: I will do that very quickly, your Honor.
15
               THE COURT: Well, it's in everybody's interest that
              And I'm talking to both of you, not just to you,
16
17
     Mr. Schmidt. You need to get moving on this.
18
               Now, if we are going to trial, how long a trial is
      this?
19
20
               MS. KELLY: The government's case is less than a week,
21
      your Honor.
22
               THE COURT:
                          How many days?
23
               MS. KELLY:
                           Approximately four.
24
                           Any forecast from the defense as to how
               THE COURT:
25
      long, if at all, you would be if the case goes to trial?
```

25

MR. SCHMIDT: I could say that, at most, it would be 1 2 two days. The issue that's problematic is that the witnesses 3 are not in the Southern District of New York, nor nearby. 4 potential witnesses are either in Florida or in Texas. THE COURT: Well, you're going to have to deal with 5 6 that. 7 MR. SCHMIDT: I understand that, but it does — THE COURT: You know my proposition is somebody runs 8 out of witnesses, they're done. 9 10 MR. SCHMIDT: I understand that, your Honor. 11 THE COURT: It's a tough time of the year also, both 12 for travel, holidays. So we're going to need to do it 13 consecutive days. Not Fridays, but consecutive days. 14 Anything else? 15 MR. SCHMIDT: Your Honor, if we're going to trial, an in limine motion that we would be preparing would impact 16 17 whether or not we need to bring up a witness from out of town. Normally, I see from your rules that in limine motions need to 18 be filed ten days before the beginning of trial. I'm assuming 19 20 that it has to be by ten days before trial. Then I can file 21 that sooner? 22 THE COURT: Oh, yes, sure. Absolutely. Absolutely. 23 Thanks, folks. 24 MR. SCHMIDT: Thank you.

(Adjourned)